City Nouns

## 📜 Proposal: Remediation of Governance Centralization and Refund of Builder DAO Grant Funds

### TL;DR

City Nouns DAO has drifted from the decentralized principles under which Builder DAO issued its grant. This proposal outlines corrective steps to restore legitimacy, minimize reputational risk to Builder DAO, and request the return of unspent funds due to breached assumptions. Over 40% of votes come from sybil-linked founder wallets, and all council and treasury authority has been consolidated without DAO consent.

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## 1. 📚 Background

Builder DAO awarded 4 ETH based on City Nouns’ stated commitment to decentralization, community onboarding, and protocol-aligned governance. The proposal emphasized scaling city-based generative DAOs using Nouns Builder, onboarding new artists and local communities into Web3, and creating a repeatable, transparent, and participatory framework for city launches.

Instead, authority was consolidated in two founders in the removal of the 3rd founder without DAO vote or notice ([see transaction](https://nouns.build/dao/base/0xdf4f168ba41c88ab4d0f1e2117110600c7e44b6d/vote/8)), who then appointed all “chosen” council members without DAO input, retained discretionary veto power, and created sybil wallet clusters that suppress dissent through controlled governance.

No open onboarding process or transparent elections have occurred for new cities. In the funding request, Builder DAO was promised:

🗓️ **May 22, 2025 – Nouns KC Launch (Global Pizza Day)**

* Launch Nouns KC DAO with daily auctions
* Release special mint collection to onboard members and fund treasury
* Host live minting + activation event in Kansas City
* Announce VIP event for mint/token holders

🚫 This has not been executed. Other cities have not had applications approved for launch. Instead of empowering communities through decentralized culture and governance, the current architecture replicates a system of top-down control, undermining the protocol’s ethos and Builder DAO’s values of credible neutrality and community-led scalability.

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## 2. 🚨 Evidence of Centralization

### 2.1 Sybil Wallet Voting ([Appendix A](#appendix-a-sybil-wallet-clusters))

Two wallet clusters linked to founders cast over 40% of votes on recent proposals, suppressing dissent and skewing outcomes.

### 2.2 Founder-Appointed Council

All four inaugural council signers were appointed directly by one DAO member, without nomination, vote, or community discussion.
[https://discord.com/channels/1379299049122828340/1379317358400634911/1382117991352893450](https://discord.com/channels/1379299049122828340/1379317358400634911/1382117991352893450)

### 2.3 Council Wallet Reserve

Founders control a multisig holding 10% of supply and can deploy 20% quarterly, creating de facto voting majority with no DAO oversight.

### 2.4 Discretionary Veto Power

Founders retain unilateral veto power through custom logic and council multisig, with no expiration or override.
[https://nouns.build/dao/base/0xdf4f168ba41c88ab4d0f1e2117110600c7e44b6d/vote/8](https://nouns.build/dao/base/0xdf4f168ba41c88ab4d0f1e2117110600c7e44b6d/vote/8)

### 2.5 Grants Wallet Oversight

The same appointed council controls the 5% grants wallet, allowing closed-door fund distribution.

### 2.6 Self-Awarded Tokens

Council members award themselves 1 CITY token quarterly without DAO ratification.
[https://nouns.build/dao/base/0xdf4f168ba41c88ab4d0f1e2117110600c7e44b6d/vote/8](https://nouns.build/dao/base/0xdf4f168ba41c88ab4d0f1e2117110600c7e44b6d/vote/8)

### 2.7 Resignation Loophole

Founders can resign and rejoin the council instantly, creating perpetual power retention.

### 2.8 Proposal Gatekeeping

Only pre-approved distributions by the council are allowed to proceed to DAO vote.

### 2.9 Information Asymmetry

Critical updates (multisig edits, partner onboarding) are disclosed after-the-fact.

### 2.10 Top-Down Messaging

Public materials emphasize stability and founder discretion over community control.

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## 3. ❗ Impact on DAO Legitimacy

* Token-holder disenfranchisement
* High governance capture risk
* Misaligned funding precedent for Builder DAO
* Breaks open-source DAO governance norms

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## 4. ✅ Requested Actions

### ⏱️ Immediate (within 7 days):

* Freeze Council and Grants wallets pending audit of signer control, token flows, and sybil clusters

### 🔎 Within 30 Days:

* **Publish a Transparency Report** detailing:

  * Council wallet and Grants wallet usage
  * Multisig signer activity
  * Token issuance and movement

### 🔁 Within 45 Days:

* **Replace all appointed Council members with verified Founder Shovel stewards.**

  The new Council shall consist of:

  * The original 12 wallets holding **Founder Shovel NFTs** (issued to the first 12 successful City Noun auction winners)
  * Individuals who:

    * Complete **BrightID verification**
    * Publicly declare governance intent
    * Agree to uphold the DAO’s mission, transparency, and ethics
      🪙 **If fewer than 5 holders step forward**, the DAO will hold elections to fill the remaining seats.
      📆 **Term Duration:** 6-month interim term
      🧩 **Mandate:**
  * Rebuild trust with community
  * Draft signer rotation & elections framework
  * Propose updated charter for ratification

  ## **🗳️ Within 60 days:**

  * Launch a DAO-wide election for new Council signers, with term limits and clear replacement processes

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## 5. ⚖️ Accountability Mechanisms

* **Reversion Clause**: If deadlines are missed, Founder Shovel Council structure is revoked and DAO proceeds to open elections
* **Refund Clause**: If deadlines are missed, DAO must refund any remaining Builder DAO funds.
* **Third-Party Audit** to mediate disputes and validate facts

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## 6. 🧨 Conclusion

Proposals 8 & 9 codified centralized power under the guise of structure. The DAO has been overtaken by founder appointees, opaque vetoes, and anti-DAO operations.

This proposal offers a concrete, restorative alternative — not just in funding accountability, but in **realigning the DAO with its decentralized mission**.

✅ A YES vote restores legitimacy, enfranchises token holders, and ensures that governance remains in the hands of the City Nouns community — not behind closed multisigs.

---

## 📎 Appendix A: Sybil Wallet Clusters

### 🔗 Cluster A: Likely Sybil Wallets

| ENS             | Wallet Address        | # CITY TOKENS | TX HASH               | TOKEN ID | DETAILS                                           |
| --------------- | --------------------- | ------------- | --------------------- | -------- | ------------------------------------------------- |
| oceanandsea.eth | 0x513d8f5d...f605d6   | 1             | 0xddd99334...fc1405af | 9        | Received from zameesco.eth on 6-12-2025           |
| n/a             | 0x8b40159c...f19109EB | 1             | 0x4cca3594...8ad1fee  | 36       | New wallet, received from zameesco.eth 06-09-2025 |
| n/a             | 0xd6604926...43dCd108 | 1             | 0x7429e403...fc2e71a  | 12       | Funded by zameesco.eth for token bid              |
| juggerswap.eth  | 0xa244e45a...2B27A8D  | 2             | 0xf4c85640...f8567b21 | 46, 52   | Funded 0.05 ETH, outbid Mary                      |
| n/a             | 0x0b288181...5419beb  | 1             | 0xa20dd5e3...9179d50f | 55       | Previously owned zameesco.eth ENS                 |

### 🤝 Cluster B: Cohort / Aligned Wallets

| ENS            | Wallet Address        | # CITY TOKENS | TOKEN IDS                    | INFO                              | TX HASH            |
| -------------- | --------------------- | ------------- | ---------------------------- | --------------------------------- | ------------------ |
| zameesco.eth   | 0x1ef49722...c2783130 | 9             | \[8,13,14,38,42,43,44,48,49] | Founder-controlled                |                    |
| Connor B       | 0x910e6f25...9eB8c4F  | 1             | \[37]                        | Gifted by zameesco.eth 06-09-2025 | 0xaf887e...65d8bdd |
| ryanwright.eth | 0xa7c0a9df...881934e5 | 2             | \[17,18]                     | Airdropped tokens via Proposal 1  |                    |

### 📊 Vote Share Breakdown

* Sybil Wallets: **6 votes** (12.7%)
* Cohort Wallets: **12 votes** (25.5%)
* Multisigs 1 & 2: **9 votes** (19.1%)
* Other DAO Members: **20 votes** (42.5%)

Total controlled by founders without multisig tokens: 39%

### ⚠️ Execution Disclaimer for Proposals 8 & 9

## 🛑 Important Clarification: As of this proposal’s posting, Proposals 8 and 9 have not been executed onchain. As such:

No authority, powers, or permissions granted in Proposal 8 (Council Governance Framework) or Proposal 9 (Code of Ethics) shall be considered binding or applicable to this proposal, its implementation, or any DAO operations referenced herein.

Any attempt to use unexecuted powers from Props 8 & 9 to override, block, or reinterpret this corrective proposal will be considered invalid and non-compliant with DAO process.

This stipulation affirms the community’s right to override unratified centralizations and to pursue meaningful course correction in line with the protocol’s founding values.


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